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Most of the empirical evidence regarding the impact of reductions of standard working hours
analyzes its e¤ects on employment outcomes, family life balance and social networks, but there is
no empirical evidence of its e¤ects on health outcomes. This study uses panel data for France and
Portugal and exploits the exogenous variation of working hours coming from labour regulation and
estimate its impact on health outcomes (from 39 to 35 hours a week and from 44 to 40 hours a week
respectively). Results suggest that the mandatory reduction of standard working hours decreased
the working hours of treated individuals (and not the hours of individuals in the control group).
Furthermore, results also suggest that the fact of being treated generated a negative (positive)
e¤ect on young males (females)health in France. No e¤ects on health outcomes were found for
Portugal.
JEL Classication: I18, J08, J18, J22.
Key Words: Standard Working Hours, Labour Regulation, Health Outcomes, Promotions.
1 Introduction
It is important to understand how reductions in working hours a¤ect workershealth, as several insti-
tutions have suggested this kind of policy. In particular, throughout the 20th century, the International
Labour Organization (ILO) strongly supported the reduction of working hours specically because of
its potential benets to workershealth (International Labour Organization 1990). Similarly, in 1993
the European Union implemented the European Time Directive, which explicitly recommended that
member countries reduce their weekly working hours to potentially improve their citizenshealth.
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The rationale behind these recommendations is that longer working hours may be detrimental to
workershealth because they disrupt workersinternal and external recovery (especially the latter).1
In reference to internal recovery, Spurgeon et al. (1997) suggest that longer working hours negatively
a¤ect workers health both directly and indirectly. Longer hours are directly harmful to workers
health because they cause stress as workers try to maintain performance levels while facing increasing
fatigue, and they are indirectly harmful because they increase the length of time that a worker is
exposed to other sources of workplace stress. Taris et al. (2006) suggest that internal recovery will
depend mainly on the characteristics of each job and that longer working hours will a¤ect external
recovery mainly by shortening the periods when individuals rest.2 Working longer hours will generate
a spiral, since those workers who do not fully recover from a work day will have to invest additional
e¤ort to perform adequately during the following day, resulting in an increased intensity of negative
load reactions that appeal even more strongly to the recovery process. These e¤ects will accumulate
over time, a¤ecting health outcomes (Sluiter et al. 2003).
However, apart from these negative e¤ects that support international organizationsclaims, longer
working hours may also have some positive e¤ects, as they are positively associated with current and
future earnings and with faster rates of career progression (Francesconi 2001); since health improves
with earnings (Deaton 2003), higher earnings should increase individualshealth status. Furthermore,
the literature on promotions supports these ideas. In particular, Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Rosen
(1986) view promotion as a tournament in which promotions are allocated to those workers who rank
higher than all other workers in a group in a given period. The probability of getting promoted provides
an incentive to exert e¤ort, and, as this e¤ort or propensity to work hard is not directly observable,
rms will use indicators, such as hours of work or overtime hours, to select workers for promotion.
Thus, a mandatory reduction in working hours for treated individuals (relative to controls) will limit
the scope for competition via hours for this group of workers.3 This negative e¤ect on the probability
of promotions (which a¤ects the future income pattern) may have a negative impact on health, as
individuals may become concerned and stressed about their future career and income. This e¤ect is
in line with the implications derived from the e¤ort-reward imbalance (ERI) model (Siegrist 1996).
In general, the ERI model acknowledges the link between high-cost/low-gain conditions, which are
considered particularly stressful. One example of this situation, is a high-e¤ort situation associated
1 Internal recovery is the workers capacity to recover during working hours, and external recovery is the workers
capacity to recover outside o¢ ce hours (Taris et al. 2006).
2This points to another open debate in organizational psychology: it is not even clear whether what causes negative
health e¤ects is the length or the organization of the working hours. The only consensus here is that something should be
done, since countries like the United Kingdom face costs of around £ 1.24 billion a year in stress-related illnesses (Beswick
and White 2003).
3Firms have two alternatives when a law that reduces standard working hours is imposed (if the employee is not red).
On the one hand, rms can reduce the treated workerstotal number of hours. On the other hand, rms can maintain
the total number of hours and pay overtime. In the former case, the probability of promotion is negatively a¤ected by
the reasons explained above, and this may negatively a¤ect health. For the latter case, and with a heterogeneous pool of
workers, rms will be more willing to pay overtime for the most productive workers, putting extra pressure on workers
to show that they belong to this group, and in this way a¤ecting their health status. Additionally, if workers foresee that
they are likely to lose their jobs because of an increase in the marginal cost of employment relative to the marginal costs
of hours, they will experience additional negative pressure on their health status.
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with no prospects for promotion.
Therefore, reducing working hours may produce a trade-o¤ between these two e¤ects, thus having
a theoretically ambiguous e¤ect. For this reason, empirical evidence is needed.
To identify how reducing working hours a¤ects health is complicated, as the number of working
hours might be endogenous due to the so-called healthy worker e¤ect (Frijters et al. 2009).4 This
is the main caveat of previous studies that analyze the link between health and working hours (see
Beswick and White [2003] and van der Hulst [2003] for surveys). To overcome this problem I use
a change in regulation as an exogenous reduction in the maximum amount of weekly working hours
to analyze its e¤ect on health outcomes. Moreover, we analyze two di¤erent countries, each with a
di¤erent threshold of working hours: France, which reduced its standard weekly working hours from
39 to 35 in 1998, and Portugal, which reduced its hours from 44 to 40 in 1996.
It is important to acknowledge that we are studying only the short-term e¤ects of a mandatory
reduction in the standard working hours on health outcomes. We do not analyze the long-term e¤ects,
as we face some data constraints. For our analysis we use the eight waves of the European Com-
munity Household Panel (ECHP) for France and Portugal, which, despite the countriesinstitutional
di¤erences, enhances comparability since the countries use a common questionnaire. The empirical
framework used is a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach in a random-e¤ects ordered-probit setup, which
will allow us to control for individual heterogeneity as well as initial health status.
The structure of this study is as follows. Section 2 presents the existing empirical evidence.
Section 3 describes the institutional background of labour regulation in France and Portugal. Section
4 presents the identication strategy, while section 5 presents the data and the summary statistics.
Finally, section 6 presents the results and the sensitivity analysis, and section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical evidence on reductions of working hours
Despite the existence of studies that analyze the e¤ect of mandatory reductions in standard working
hours on labour market outcomes, welfare, family balance, and social networks, there is no evidence
on the e¤ect of this kind of policy on health outcomes. The only related evidence available is that
which focuses on analyzing the relationship between health and working hours (see Beswick and White
[2003] and van der Hulst [2003] for surveys and Yang et al. [2006] and Artazcoz et al. [2007] for some
newer evidence). These studies have the caveat that working hours and health may be simultaneously
determined because of the so-called healthy worker e¤ect (see Frijters et al. [2009]). In a regression
framework, with health as a dependent variable and working hours as a covariate, this implies that
if working hours decrease, then that reduction in working hours may be endogenous; hence, some
methods need to be applied in order to overcome this potential bias on the coe¢ cient of working
hours.
4The healthy worker e¤ect states that individuals with better health will tend to work longer hours than those with
worse health.
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Among those studies that try to analyze the link between working hours and health are Bardasi
and Francesconi (2000), Ulker (2006), and Llena-Nozal (2009). Bardasi and Francesconi (2000) use
longitudinal data on male and female workers drawn from the rst seven waves of the British Household
Panel Survey, 1991-1997, to study how nonstandard employment a¤ects mental health.5 The authors
use a mental health indicator as the dependent variable (derived from the General Health Questionnaire
[GHQ]) and a two-period lagged rst-di¤erence model that yields estimates of the e¤ect of nonstandard
employment on psychological well-being under some strong orthogonality conditions on the process
governing the dynamic path of unobservable inputs. They nd that working long hours in Britain
(>48 hours per week) has no impact on GHQ scores; nevertheless, and as they recognize, even these
estimates must be taken with some caution because the imposed orthogonality conditions are strong.6
Further examples are Ulker (2006) and Llena-Nozal (2009), who use longitudinal data to empirically
assess how changes in labour market status and working conditions a¤ect health (measured as SF36
scores and GHQ scores, respectively) in Australia (Ulker) and in several countries (Llena-Nozal). The
within-group estimators used in both studies eliminate the bias from the time-invariant individual
unobserved heterogeneity, but that does not solve the healthy worker e¤ect that biases their results.
Llena-Nozals results suggest that negative mental health e¤ects result from working overtime hours for
Australian, Canadian, and British men; no e¤ects exist for Canadian women, Swiss men and women,
or British women; and positive e¤ects exist for Australian women. Ulkers results show a lower general
health index for those men who work long hours.
3 Institutional background: The cases of Portugal and France
In Portugal, a law was introduced on December 1, 1996, to gradually reduce the maximum number
of weekly working hours from 44 to 40. The law was passed because the newly elected government
wanted to speed up convergence of the "traditionally long hours of work" in Portugal to the European
average (Varejao 2005). This was done in two rounds and only for private-sector workers. The rst
one applied immediately (i.e., from December, 1, 1996) and mandated a reduction of two hours for all
workers who were currently working 42 hours a week or more and a reduction for all employees who
were working 40 to 42 hours per week. The second round started on December 1, 1997, and mandated
that all workweeks should meet the new standard of 40 hours. With respect to overtime pay, the rst
hour had a premium of 50%, and the premium increased to 75% for additional overtime hours. This
was not changed by the new law (although the activation point for overtime premiums was changed
to 40 hours); nevertheless, some exibility was introduced with the new law. The reduction took into
account that the normal workweek could be dened on a four-month average. The maximum number
of hours was allowed to increase by two hours per day if the total did not exceed 10 hours per day
5Notice that they analyze the e¤ect of several types of nonstandard employment on health outcomes, including long
working hours.
6Apart from the strong restrictions on the process governing the temporal path of the unobserved variables that a¤ect
health outcomes, one further caveat is that their methodology assumes that changes in working hours occur two periods
before the change in mental health, which in their own words is "arguably a long period of time".
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and 50 hours per week (Raposo and van Ours 2010). The law explicitly stated that the monthly wage
could not decrease.
In France, in June 1998 the government passed the Aubry I law. This law had two parts. First, it
established a weekly 35-hour limit in the private sector (from a previous limit of 39 hours), to begin
January 1, 2000, for rms with more than 20 employees. For rms with fewer than 20 employees,
the deadline was January 1, 2002. Besides excluding workers in the public sector, it also excluded
independent workers. Before and after the reform, overtime was paid at a higher rate 25% for the
rst eight hours above the limit of 39 hours, and 50% for any additional overtime. The law did not
change these rates, but it did shift the activation point for the overtime premium to 35 hours. Second,
the Aubry I law also established nancial incentives for rms (payroll tax subsidies).7 Then, during
2000, a second Aubry law was passed (called Aubry II) in order to introduce more detailed legal
provisions regarding overtime (e.g., it introduced exibility to the adjustment to the 35-hour limit)
and in order to conrm the limit of 35 hours per week established in the Aubry I law. As in Portugal,
the law explicitly forbade a decrease in the monthly wage.
4 Empirical strategy and estimation
4.1 E¤ect on Hours
Before we analyze the health e¤ect of the mentioned regulation we briey investigate if the regulation
a¤ected or not the working hours of treated workers. This is important because we want to evaluate
whether the regulation has further e¤ects on health mediated through changes in work hours. In the
following section we investigate (more extensively, as it is our main goal) the indirect e¤ect of the
regulation on health. Thus, in order to study the e¤ect of the regulation on working hours we estimate
the following regression (as in Sánchez [2013]):
Hoursit = 
0xit + 01g1i + 
0
2g2i + 
0dt + 01g1idt + 
0
2g2idt + "it (1)
Where Hours refers to weekly working hours for individual i at period t, xit is a vector of covari-
ates and it does not include a constant. gkidt represents the interaction variable between the time
dummy (dt) and the group dummy (gki) where k = 1; 2 representing the control and treatment group
respectively. In this way we will focus on 01and 
0
2 which will give us the e¤ect of the regulation on
the control and treatment groupweekly working hours. The next step is to present the model used
to estimate the e¤ect of the regulation on health outcomes.
7By granting nancial incentives to alleviate labour costs, the law encouraged rms to reduce hours by 10% and
increase the number of employees by 6% before legal deadlines were set (Askenazy 2008).
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4.2 E¤ect on Health
To analyze the e¤ect of the regulation on health outcomes, we use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach
in a random-e¤ect ordered probit. The treated group is dened as those individuals whose hours
are just below the old threshold and above the new one, and the control group is dened as those
individuals whose hours are just below the new threshold. All these were dened regarding their
working hours prior the policy change (more detail below).
It is crucial to include individual unobservable heterogeneity in these kind of studies since, as
Adams et al. (2003) suggest, the apparent signicant causation of some covariates on health outcomes
may be due to an unobservable persistence that is correlated with covariates and health outcomes.
Also, a sequence of repeated observations on the same individuals makes it possible to allow for
unobservable but persistent di¤erences in the way that individuals translate their perceptions of health
into survey responses. Unfortunately, it will not be correct to include a lagged dependent variable as
a covariate when a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach is used, as we would be analyzing the change of
the probability of reporting a given level of health in period t conditional on the previous health status
for the pre- and post-treatment periods for the control and treatment groups. That would force the
previous health status to be the same in post-treatment periods between the treatment and control
groups.8 Thus we estimate:
Pit;j = P (hit = j) = 

j   0xit   0zit1   0gi    0rt   0(gi  rt)    0(zit1  rt)  i
	
(2)
 j 1   0xit   0zit1   0gi    0rt   0(gi  rt)    0(zit1  rt)  i	
where  f:g is the standard normal distribution function. xit is a set of observed variables for
individual i at period t which may be associated with health and zit1 is a vector of dummies for the
individuals health status in their rst year t1 (i.e. 1994), ; ; ; ;  and  are parameters to be
estimated, i is an individual-specic and time-invariant random component which is assumed to be
distributed as N(0; 2). As is typical in a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach, we include a group e¤ect
(gi) equal to one for those individuals treated, time e¤ects (rt) and interactions between these two
(gi  rt) and whose parameter reects the di¤erence-in-di¤erence e¤ect. Our approach would imply
8 In particular, if we include a one-period lagged dependent variable instead of initial health status, under this latter
setup the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient would not capture the e¤ect of the policy change on health outcomes of
period t, as we would be doing a ceteris paribus analysis on the change of P(yit = jj yit 1;xit;::::), which conditions on
yi;t 1for the pre- and post-treatment periods for the control and the treatment group. That would not be correct, as the
lagged dependent variable will be forced to be the same in post-treatment periods between the treatment and control
groups. Therefore, if the policy change had any e¤ect, this latter approach would be incorrect. In the Robustness of
the results section, we also present the coe¢ cients obtained when a lagged dependent variable is included as a control
instead of the initial health status. The results do not change signicantly for Portugal, but there are some di¤erences
for France (shown below).
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that the health status of the rst period would have the same impact on the health status of the
second, third, and so on periods. To allow for di¤erent impacts of the initial health status by year, we
add interactive terms (zit1  rt) between the time e¤ect (rt) and the health status of the initial period
(zit1).Thus, our interest lies in the coe¢ cient .
9 xit and zit1 are assumed uncorrelated with "is for
all t and s. The error term "it is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2
and uncorrelated across individuals and waves and uncorrelated with .
Before the actual estimation, we need to deal with two challenges. Firstly, the random e¤ect or-
dered probit, assumes that there is no correlation between the individual e¤ect (i) and the covariates.
This seems to be very restrictive in our setting since individual unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be
correlated with the covariates (e.g. unobservable psychological characteristics that make individuals
respond in a particular way to the health survey might be correlated with covariates as age or gender).
Since the coe¢ cients estimated by the random e¤ect estimator are in general inconsistent under this
setting (especially when T is not very large) we can use Mundlaks (1978) parameterization. This
captures the correlation between the individual e¤ect (i) and the average of the regressors. Thus, we
use:
i = 0 + 
0
1xi + ui (3)
where xi is the average over the sample period of the observations on the exogenous time variant
variables. By construction ui is distributed N(0;2u) and independent of the xit variables and the
idiosyncratic error term ("it).10 Thus, i in equation (2) is replaced by equation (3).11
Finally, we follow the approach adopted by Contoyannis et al. (2004b) which is to split the sample
by gender and age groups before estimating our models to see if there are heterogeneous e¤ects of the
covariates by subgroups. Evidence of very di¤erent results could indicate heterogeneity with respect
to cut o¤ points (van Doorslaer and Jones 2003).
5 Data
5.1 Data description
We use the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which is a standardized panel survey
used to interview a sample of households and persons every year in the European Union. These
9This assumes homogeneous e¤ects of the treatment, which represents the change in the intercept between the treated
and control groups. To allow for heterogeneous e¤ects, one could include interactions between the group dummy, the
time e¤ect, and xit, although that would have a degrees-of-freedom cost. Therefore, we maintain the assumption of
homogeneous e¤ects. This seems reasonable, as the interactive terms added to capture the heterogeneous e¤ects are not
signicant in the cases of France and Portugal.
10By construction refers to the fact that once the distribution of i is dened, ui has the same distribution.
11This results in a likelihood that can be easily maximized using common software (e.g. Gllamm in STATA).
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interviews cover a wide range of topics concerning living conditions, including the interviewees in-
come information, nancial situation in a wider sense, working life, housing situation, and health,
among other things. The sample size is 170,000 individuals in the initial wave for the 12 countries
included. The ECHP had a total duration of eight years, running from 1994 to 2001 (eight waves).
The main advantage is that information is homogeneous among countries since the questionnaire is
similar in each case. This source of data is coordinated by the European Commissions Statistical
O¢ ce (EUROSTAT).
5.2 Measures of health: SAH
One of the rst concerns in studies that analyze health is how to measure it. In our case, given that
we are using regulation of working hours as one of the covariates, we needed data that contains both
the labour and health information of individuals. Because of its wide use in health economics models,
SAH is a natural choice. Several socioeconomic surveys measure SAH and, despite some di¤erences,
it has a common frame. In the ECHP, it is generally dened by a response to the following question:
would you say that your health has on the whole been excellent/good/fair/poor/very poor? SAH is
measured as a categorical variable indicator from 1 (higher category) to 5 (lower category). Since
SAH is a subjective measure of health, it is subject to criticism, as it may be a¤ected by measurement
error. Furthermore, it has been argued that the mapping of "true health" into SAH categories may vary
with respondent characteristics. This happens when population subgroups use systematically di¤erent
cuto¤-points levels when reporting their SAH, despite having the same level of "true health".12 Despite
these caveats, SAH has been used widely in previous studies of the relationships between health and
socioeconomic status (e.g., Adams et al. 2003) and between health and lifestyle (e.g., Contoyannis et
al. 2004a). Moreover, SAH has been shown to be a powerful predictor of subsequent mortality (e.g.,
Idler and Benyamini 1997) and a good predictor of subsequent use of medical care.13 It has also been
shown that inequalities in SAH predict inequalities in mortality (e.g., van Doorslaer and Gerdtham
2003). Furthermore, an appealing characteristic of general health measures such as SAH is their ability
to encapsulate and summarize a multitude of health conditions. This latter point is important since,
in general, objective measures of health status are rare in survey data, and where they do exist they
are often too specic to particular health conditions (Hernandez-Quevedo et al. 2005). Therefore, in
our study we use SAH as a measure of health for Portugal and France for waves 1 through 8. Also,
we merge the worst two categories due to the small sample size of these categories (hence we end with
4 categories).
Finally, it is important to mention that because of the econometric method described above, which
assumes that the top category is the one with better health, we invert SAH. In this way, SAH goes
from 1 (worse health) to 4 (better health).
12This source of heterogeneity with respect to cuto¤ points has been termed "state dependent reporting bias" (Kerkhofs
and Lindeboom 1995), "scale of reference bias" (Groot 2000), and "response category cut-point shift" (Murray et al.
2001).
13 Its predictive power does not appear to vary across socioeconomic groups (see, e.g., Burström and Fredlund 2001).
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5.3 Covariates used
The included covariates can be divided into three groups: socioeconomic variables, occupational and
rm-related variables, and other variables. For the rst group we include dummy variables representing
marital status (married, widowed, or divorced/separated), with single as the reference category; size
of the household (the number of people living in the same household); and two dummies to account
for the number of children at di¤erent ages (<12 and <16). The income variable is the logarithm of
equivalised annual household income, equivalised by the OECD-modied scale to adjust for household
size and composition.14 We include two dummies for the highest level of educational qualication
completed (second stage [ISCED 3] and third level [ISCED 5-7]); less than second stage (ISCED 0-2)
is the base group.15
For the occupational and rm-related variables, we use three dummies for the type of work contracts
(xed-term or short-term, casual work with no contract, and some other working arrangements), where
permanent employment is the base group; occupational dummies; and industry dummies (following
the ILO categories). We include dummies to control for the level of job satisfaction, which is in line
with Datta Gupta and Kristensen (2008), who use this variable as a proxy for job stressors.16 For the
other variables, we include age as a second-order polynomial (i.e., age and age
2
100 ).
5.4 Summary statistics and the evolution of health outcomes and weekly working
hours
5.4.1 Summary Statistics
For the French case, the sample excludes those individuals who are employed in paid apprenticeships or
training schemes, are self-employed, or are classied as unpaid family workers. We also exclude those
who do not work in the private sector, those who work in rms that have fewer than 20 employees,
or those younger than 20 or older than 60. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach described above
requires the denition of a control and a treatment group and a pre- and post-treatment period. For
the French case, as the interviews were conducted almost entirely in October of each year, the pre-
treatment period was dened as 1994-1997 and the post-treatment period as 1998 onwards. Therefore,
we dened the control group as those individuals who were working 30-35 hours a week prior the policy
change (i.e. october 1997) and the treatment group as those who were working 36-39 hours per week
before the policy change (i.e. october 1997).17
14The OEDC-modied scale gives a weight of 1 to the rst adult, 0.5 to other persons age 14 or over, and 0.3 to each
child younger than 14. For each person, the "equivalised total net income" is calculated as its household total net income
divided by equivalised household size. In this case, we use the logarithm of household income (OEDC-modied scale),
taking into account the concavity in the health-income relationship.
15The ISCED classication comes from the International Standard Classication of Education from UNESCO. It is a
seven-level scale that allows for the comparison of educational levels in di¤erent countries.
16Dummies for job satisfaction levels might be endogenous. Nevertheless, we include them in the model since in some
cases they are signicant and also because their exclusion does not a¤ect the coe¢ cient of interest.
17 It could be the case that the policy change may a¤ect di¤erently employees who were working 39 hours just before the
policy change relative to those who were working 36 hours (even though both are treated, but in a di¤erent magnitude).
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For the Portuguese case, the estimation excludes those individuals who are employed in paid
apprenticeships or training schemes, are self-employed, or are classied as unpaid family workers. We
also exclude those individuals who work in the public administration and defense sectors and those
who are younger than 20 or older than 60. For the Portuguese case, we dened our pre-treatment
period as 1994-1996 and our post-treatment period as 1997 onwards.18 Also, we dened our control
group as those workers who were working 37-40 hours a week before the policy change (i.e. october
1996) and our treatment group as those who were working 41-44 hours a week just before the policy
change occurred (i.e. october 1996).
In Table I we present the summary statistics of the variables under analysis and the covariates
separately for each country in the moment just before the policy was in place.19 This table suggests that
most of the covariate averages are very similar when the control and treatment groups are compared
within each country. This suggests that most variables are well balanced between the control and
treatment group. This is also true when we compare the distribution of each covariate (see, e.g., the
age situation in Portugal, presented in Figure 1)20. The main di¤erences between the control and
treatment groups are in occupation and industry. These can be observed, for example, by looking at
Figure 2 and Figure 3 for the Portuguese case.21 These results were expected, as the number of
job hours di¤ers across occupations and industries, which suggests that controlling for occupation and
industry is important for our purposes.
5.4.2 Evolution of Working Hours and Health
As working hours and health status are crucial in our analysis we present a further description of
both variables by treatment group and year. Regarding weekly working hours we nd the following:
(a) In the Frech case we observe that until 1997 the average of weekly working hours stays right
around 39 hours for the treated group (see Figure 4)); nevertheless, from 1998, when the policy
was implemented, weekly working hours for treated individuals decreased signicantly to almost 37
hours in 2000, which implies a reduction of around 2 working hours per week (on average). The
declining trend increased in 1999 probably in order to meet the January 2000 deadline that the French
government set when they announced the policy. Despite this behaviour on treated individuals it is
possible to observe no signicant changes on individuals belonging to the control group.
In the same line, results of Table II suggest that working hours regulation reduced in around 2 the
weekly working hours for treated individuals in France. Furthermore, we observe that the regulation
did not have almost any e¤ect on those individuals who belong to the control group. These results
are similar to the ones found by Goux, Maurin, and Petrongolo (2011). The decline in weekly working
We decided to keep the denition of treated to those employees who were working 36-39 because if we narrow it the
sample size will became too small. Hence we are capturing the average e¤ect on treated individuals. The same idea
applies to the Portuguese case.
18We used these groupings because all the interviews were carried out in October 1996 and the policy change was in
place from December 1, 1996.
19 In each case, we discuss the nal sample data.
20Because of the large number of gures, the rest of the distributions are not presented but are available on request.
21Similar situations occur for France. These gures are not included but they are available on request.
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hours of the treated group (1998-2000) coincides with a break on the declining trend observed in SAH
with a positive and not signicant e¤ect in 1999 (see Figure 5). On the other hand, for the control
group we observe a declining trend in SAH during the complete period analyzed.
In the case of Portugal and as shown in Figure 6, we observe a drop of around 2,5 weekly working
hours for treated individuals from 1996 to 1998, period when legislated reductions in working hours
took place. Similarly to the French case, we do not observe any signicant change of working hours for
those individuals who belong to the control group. These observational ndings coincide with what
we found in Table II were a reduction of around 2,5 hours is found for the treated group and no
signicant variation is found for the control group. Regarding the average SAH for treated individuals
in Portugal, we observe a declining trend in the SAH measure across time until 1997, then a slight
increase in 1998, and a bit further increase in 1999 (Figure 6). Afterwards, it started to decrease
marginally. This behaviour might suggest a lagged e¤ect on health. For individuals belonging to the
control group we do not observe signicant changes.
Therefore, by looking at the summary statistics of treated and control individuals, before and after
the policy change, we observe a reduction of weekly working hours for the treated group while there
were no signicant reductions for individuals in the control group. Hence, from the preliminar data
analysis it seems that the mandatory reduction had an e¤ect on working hours. Results on health are
less obvious from the gures, hence we procceed in the next section to the estimation of our model in
order to see what the data suggests.
6 Results
6.1 The case of Portugal
Before going to our main set of results, we briey discuss our results of equation (1) that focuses
on the e¤ect of the regulation on working hours. In Table III, we see that on average the legal
reduction of working hours did not a¤ect individuals in the control group. However, the legislation
indeed reduced the working hours of treated individuals, although only in an average of around 2.5
hours a week. Results for the treated group are signicantly di¤erent from zero while results for the
control group are non signicantly di¤erent from zero. These results point to the same direction than
those presented in Table II previously discussed.
Regarding the results for health outcomes, we compute the average partial e¤ects (APEs) for each
of the four categories of SAH, but since the total changes of these probabilities should add up to zero
(and to save space), we present the results for the best two probabilities (very good health and good
health) in Table IV for men and women. In each case, we also separate the results by age range.22
From columns (1) and (2) of Table IV, we observed that for men younger than the average age
(37 years), the top two health categories (very good and good health, respectively) present negative
APEs for the treated group (41-44 hours) in 1997 and 1998. This would mean that in 1997, after
22To dene the age ranges, we used the average age of the Portuguese sample, 37 years.
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controlling for several covariates, those treated individuals have a lower probability of being in the top
two categories (i.e., having very good or good health), but as the  coe¢ cient in column (3) is not
signicant, these variations are not statistically di¤erent from zero. The same results are obtained for
men above the average age (columns [4] and [5]). These results imply that the policy did not a¤ect
the probability of reporting very good or good health for this group.
These previous analyses assume that the impact of the reduction in hours is contemporaneous, but
it could be the case that the impact of the policy takes time to show up in terms of health, as might
be implied by Figure 6. For this reason we repeated the previous estimation but replaced the group
dummy in year t by its one-year lagged value. In terms of equation (2), This implies the replacement
of gi dened at year t by gi dened at year t  1. By doing this, we expect to capture any e¤ect due
to the implementation of the policy one year later. The results can be seen in Table V for men and
women, each separated by age range. In all these cases, the e¤ects are not statistically signicant and
are similar to the contemporaneous case.
6.2 The case of France
Similarly to our Portuguese case, we rst discuss our results of equation (1) that focuses on the e¤ect
of the regulation on working hours. We see in Table III that the legal reduction of 4 hours in France
did not a¤ect individuals in the control group. However, the legislation indeed reduced the working
hours of treated individuals, although only in an average of around 2 hours a week. Again, results
for the treated group are signicantly di¤erent from zero while results for the control group are non
signicantly di¤erent from zero. This points in the same line than results of Table II previously
discussed and to the results of Goux, Maurin, and Petrongolo (2011).
Regarding health outcomes, the results for men below the average age of 39 years (columns [1]
and [2] of Table VI) show negative APEs for the top two health categories for the treated group
(e.g., 36-39 hours) in 1998 and 1999. The  coe¢ cients are signicant at 1% and 5%, respectively.
In particular, the treatment reduces the probability of reporting very good or good health by 23
percentage points (13 and 10 percentage points, respectively) in 1998 and by 17.5 percentage points
(11 and 6.5 percentage points, respectively) in 1999. The estimated APE across all periods results in a
detriment in the probability of reporting very good health and good health by 6.0 and 4.2 percentage
points, respectively.23 As the probability of reporting very good or good health in 1997 is around
67%, the e¤ect of the policy reduces the probability of reporting very good or good health by 14.9%
on average. The results for men above the average age (columns [4] and [5] of Table VI) show no
signicant e¤ects due to the policy change.
For women, results are exactly the opposite of those obtained for men. In particular, for women
below the average age, the coe¢ cient is signicant at 5% and positive in 1998 (column [9] of Table
VI). This result implies that the policy change increased the probability of reporting very good health
23This average is calculated by adding 13.1 percentage points (in 1998) plus 11 (in 1999) plus zero (in 2000 and 2001)
and dividing by 4, which equals 6.0 percentage points. A similar calculation is used to get 4.2 percentage points.
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by 15 percentage points and caused a combined increase of 13 percentage points in the probability
of reporting very good or good health. The estimated APE across all periods results in an average
increase of 3.8 percentage points in the probability of reporting very good health. As the pre-treatment
probability of reporting very good or good health for this group is 64% in 1997, our result suggests
that the e¤ect of the policy change generated an average increase of around 5.9% in the probability
of reporting very good health.24
6.3 Discussion of the results
The discussion of the results obtained above is complicated, as there are several dimensions to
consider in particular, comparisons between the treatment and control group by country, age range,
and gender. Here we present some hypotheses that might explain our results. But as we will see, more
research on this topic should be done in the future.
6.3.1 The Trade-o¤
The non-zero e¤ect of the policy change in France and the zero e¤ect in Portugal may be explained by
drawing on both the literature on promotions and the literature on psychological health e¤ects. On the
one hand, the psychological literature suggests that a reduction in working hours might have positive
e¤ects on health since individuals will have more time to recover (the so-called external recovery; Taris
et al. 2006). On the other hand, the probability of getting promoted provides an incentive for the
worker to exert e¤ort without the need for any formal contract with the rm (Francesconi 2001). As
this e¤ort or propensity to work hard is not directly observable, rms will use indicators, such as hours
of work or overtime hours, in selecting workers for promotion. Thus, a mandatory reduction in working
hours for treated individuals (relative to controls) will limit the scope for competition via hours for
this group of workers. This negative e¤ect on the probability of promotions (which a¤ects the future
income pattern) may have a negative impact on health, as individuals may become concerned and
stressed about their future career and income. This e¤ect is in line with the implications derived from
the e¤ort-reward imbalance (ERI) model (Siegrist 1996). Therefore, we may have a trade-o¤ between
two e¤ects.
6.3.2 The di¤erences in the case of Males and di¤erent age ranges
As individuals in Portugal already work longer hours than those in France, it would be more di¢ cult
for them to use overtime work as a way of increasing their chances of promotion. In other words,
the scope for competition through hours is lower in Portugal than in France. Therefore, a mandatory
reduction in working hours might have more negative e¤ects on treated relative to control men in
France than in Portugal.
24This includes coe¢ cients that are signicant at 5% at least.
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Furthermore, the promotions explanation also seems to be useful to help us explain the di¤erence
between the e¤ects found for men at di¤erent age ranges in particular, for those below versus those
above the average age (i.e., those 20-38 years old versus those 39-60 years old). This is because, if the
hypothesis about the e¤ect on promotions is true, we should expect a more negative e¤ect on those
individuals who are in the beginning or early stages of their careers relative to those who are more
settled in their jobs.
6.3.3 The di¤erences in the case of Females and di¤erent age ranges
What is more di¢ cult to explain with the promotions hypothesis are the e¤ects of the reduction
in working hours on the health status of women in France. This is because, as it was stated, our
hypothesis would suggest a negative e¤ect; however, we nd a positive one. A potential extension to
our hypothesis would be that women, and especially those below the average age (i.e., those younger
than 38 years), have already internalized that the probability of promotions in the future might be
undermined by the loss of human capital due to pregnancy. Because of that, the negative e¤ect on
the probability of promotion for those treated women relative to the control group might be smaller
than the potential positive e¤ect on health, which may give an overall positive e¤ect.
The above hypothesis is in line with what Booth and Francesconi (2000) found. They analyzed the
di¤erence of promotion predictors by gender and found that, by comparing the e¤ects by gender, there
are "striking similarities and important di¤erences". In particular, they found that working longer
overtime hours is positively associated with the probability of promotion. As an example, they point
out that the probability of promotion for men working part-time decreases by 6 percentage points
as compared to men working full-time, while the e¤ect for women working part-time is much smaller
relative to those women who work full-time. This implies that fewer hours of work for women have a
weaker negative e¤ect on the probability of promotions, which is in line with our hypothesis above.
6.4 Sensitivity Analysis
6.4.1 Attrition
In health studies (as ours), attrition is likely to be endogenous since healthier individuals should last
longer in our panel. Due to this, Jones et al. (2006) studied the health-related non-response in the rst
11 waves of the British Household Panel Survey and the full eight waves of the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP) and explored its consequences for dynamic models of the association between
socioeconomic status and self-assessed health. They use the Verbeek and Nijman (1992) test and
correct for non-response (with the inverse probability weights method) in empirical models of the e¤ect
of socioeconomic status on self-assessed health. Jones et al. (2006) found that there is health-related
non-response in the data, with those in very poor initial health more likely to drop out; nevertheless,
as they point out, "a comparison of estimates based on the balanced sample, the unbalanced sample
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and corrected for non-response by using inverse probability weights shows that, on the whole, there
are not substantive di¤erences in the average partial e¤ects of the variables of interest".
To test for the possibility of endogenous attrition, we follow the same approach. That is, we use a
variable addition test as proposed by Verbeek and Nijman (1992), which tests the signicance of an
indicator that counts the number of waves observed for each individual. The reasoning behind this
test is that if non-response is random, indicators of an individuals pattern of survey responses (e.g.,
number of waves [nw]) should not be associated with the outcome of interest (health) after controlling
for the observed covariates x:25 The results of this test for the ECHP suggest that attrition is not
endogenous for France, although for Portugal it is signicant for men and women at 10% (see Table
VII). These di¤er from the results of Jones et al. (2006), who nd that the indicator is signicant
at 1%. An explanation for this di¤erence might be that Jones et al. (2006) use the entire sample
of individuals (i.e., those older than 16 who are employed, those who are unemployed, etc.), while
in our case, and since we are interested in the e¤ect of a reduction in hours on health outcomes,
we use only those who are employed and age 20-60. This subgroup is healthier on average than, for
example, unemployed adults; therefore, the ECHP is expected to have a weaker dropout rate due to
health-related reasons.26
We also compare the coe¢ cients of the model with the indicator relative to the coe¢ cients of the
model without the indicator. We nd that the estimates are similar, which is the same result obtained
by Contoyannis et al. (2004a) and Jones et al. (2006) (see Table VIII for the Portuguese case, where
columns [1] and [2] show the results for men and columns [3] and [4] for women, and similarly Table
IX for the French case). This supports the idea that, even with endogenous attrition, its existence
does not a¤ect the estimates of the variables of interests. These results are corroborated when we
compare the coe¢ cients of the balanced and unbalanced panels for men and women in Portugal (see
Table X) and France (see Table XI). Therefore, and similarly to previous studies, we do nd some
support for no signicant e¤ects of attrition bias on the estimates of the variables of interest.27
6.4.2 Alternative denition of control groups
We present the results when slight modications are introduced to the denition of the control group
range, which can be increased or decreased and where either option has benets and costs. In our
case, the control group denition is modied by increasing and reducing its range for each country.
Results are presented in Table XII and Table XIII for Portugal and France, respectively, for some
of the veried cases. For Portugal we present the case when the control group is dened as age 36-40
instead of the 37-40 age group used above. For the French case we present the results when the control
25This means that it tests a conditional independence condition E (health j x, nw)=E(health j x).
26Another reason for the di¤erence between our result and the one presented by Jones et al. (2006) could be that our
model includes the initial health status and its interaction with the time e¤ect as covariates, while Jones et al. (2006)
use instead a lagged dependent variable as a covariate.
27This can also be done by comparing the coe¢ cients with a Hausman test. We did not, however, make such a
comparison, since the coe¢ cients are almost the same with or without the indicator and the Hausman test also has low
power (see Jones et al. 2006, 14).
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group is dened as age 31-35 instead of the 30-35 age group used above. As can be seen, results are
very similar to those presented above in each case; therefore, conclusions do not change with changes
in the denition of the control group.
6.4.3 Flexibility
In Portugal, greater exibility was introduced along with the reduction in hours. Greater exibility
may involve the reorganization of work; this reorganization, rather than the reduction in hours, may
a¤ect the health of individuals. This generally depends on the type of industry and occupation, and
given that we control for both, it is less likely to be the case.28 In France, exibility was introduced
only in 2000; hence, it should not a¤ect our results for 1998 and 1999.
6.4.4 Common macro trend and common support
Results, when the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach is used, rely on the crucial assumption of a com-
mon macro trend. In practice, this means that interactions between the group dummies and the time
e¤ects in the absence of the policy change should be insignicant, because if they were signicant it
would imply that control and treatment groups behave di¤erently when there is no policy in place.
For the Portuguese case we can observe the interaction in 1996, which is not signicant (see Table
IV). For the French case we observe the interactions for 1996 and 1997. As can be seen for both
men and women, they are not signicant (see Table VI). All these results suggest that there are no
signicant di¤erences in trajectories between the control and treatment groups before the policy takes
place.
As the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach compares the treatment group with a control group, the
latter should represent what would have happened with those treated if they had been not been
treated. In order for this to be true, one should contrast comparable individuals. This condition is
also known as full common support. In our case, this is likely since both the treatment and control
group have full common support (see, e.g., Figures 1-3) and also are very similar in observables.29
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that they are also similar in unobservable characteristics.
6.4.5 Alternative Specication
In models where health is the dependent variable, it is typical to include a lagged dependent variable
in order to try to capture health state dependence. Unfortunately, because we are exploiting a policy
change, the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient would not capture the e¤ect of the policy change on
28To further check If more exibility a¤ects my identication I have dropped from the sample those jobs with more
volatile hours. Results do not change in a signicant way. Hence, higher exibility doesn´t seem to be an important
problem in the case of Portugal.
29See summary statistics above. For the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT), full common support means that
given X, the probability of being treated is less than one, that is, P(D = 1j X) < 1. This implies that for a covariate X
there are treated and control individuals, not only treated individuals.
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health outcomes of period t. This is because we would be doing a ceteris paribus analysis on the
change of P(yit = jj yit 1;xit;::::), which conditions on yi;t 1for the pre- and post-treatment periods for
the control as well as for the treatment group. That would not be correct since, for post-treatment
periods, the lagged dependent variable would be forced to be the same between the treatment and
control groups, which may not be the case. Therefore, if the policy change had any e¤ect, this latter
approach would be incorrect. In any case, since in the health economics literature it is common to
include a lagged dependent variable as a covariate, we present in Table XIV the coe¢ cients for France
obtained when a lagged dependent variable is included as a control instead of the initial health status.
As can be seen, results are similar with respect to those in Table VI, which uses the initial health
condition as well as its interactions with the time e¤ect, although there are some di¤erences in the
signicance level for France. As expected, results are not signicantly di¤erent for Portugal.30
6.4.6 Measurement Error
The ECHP data used in our study, as all survey data, might be subject to measurement error. This
is especially important for hours of work, since measurement error in this variable could lead to
misclassication of individuals into hours groups and thereby to a dilution of the estimated e¤ect on
health outcomes. As the ECHP does not include a direct question about overtime, we might have
misclassied individuals into hours groups.31 To test how important this e¤ect is, we exclude those
sectors with higher probability of working overtime in France and Portugal just before the policy was in
place (from the LABORSTA database).32 This probability is mainly a¤ected by occupation (economic
activity). In particular, workers in wholesale retail trade, restaurants, and hotels and in community,
social, and personal services sectors have a higher probability of working overtime in Portugal in
1996. For France, sectors with a higher probability of working overtime in 1997 are wholesale retail
trade, restaurants, and hotels, as well as real estate, renting, and business activities. Therefore, if
we do have an important misclassication due to the lack of a direct question about overtime, we
should expect our results to change by excluding workers in these categories, since they should have
higher probabilities of misclassication. Results suggest that estimates do not change when we exclude
workers in the mentioned categories; hence, it seems that misclassication is not a signicant problem
in our case.This is reinforced when we see Tables XII and XIII, where our results do not change
when we modify the denition of treatment and control groups. This is because with a wider denition
of groups we should expect a lower measurement error between the two groups.
30Also, and to relax the particular functional form of the probit used in our Di¤erence in Di¤erence, we estimate our
model with the linear probability model. Results point to the same direction of the ones reported here for the ordered
probit. These results are not included but are available upon request.
31For example, someone in Portugal who reports 44 hours a week of usual hours might imply (a) 44 normal hours and
zero overtime or (b) 40 hours plus 4 hours of overtime. This is important since, without further information, in the rst
case the individual will be categorized in the treatment group and in the latter case in the control group. The same kind
of problem might arise in the French case.
32See http://laborsta.ilo.org/.
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6.4.7 E¤ect on Earnings
Another robustness check is to analyze the e¤ect of the legislation on monthly wages (i.e. earnings).
This is because someone may think that the regulation may do nothing to work hours, but just increase
earnings and via earnings it may a¤ects health. To analyze this concern we did two exercises: rstly,
we can go back to our previous result were we show that working hours indeed were reduced for treated
workers and not for control workers (Tables II and III). Secondly, because working hours decreased
hourly wages increased. Thus, we should check what happened to monthly wages (i.e. earnings). If
monthly wages remain constant any impact on health outcomes can be attributed to working hours
regulation and not higher earnings. To study this potential e¤ect we re-estimate equation (1) but
replacing the dependent variable for ln(hourly wage). The results are presented in the second column
of Table III. We observe that the reduction of weekly working hours is linked to higher hourly wages
only for treated workers. In the case of Portugal, treated individuals (with a reduction of around
2.5 weekly hours, i.e. a 5.7% reduction in weekly hours) have a 5.4% increment in hourly wage. In
the case of France an average decrease of around 2 hours per week from the original 39 hours (i.e. a
5.1% reduction) generated a 4.9% increment in hourly wage for treated individuals. Thus, for treated
workers hourly wages increased in the same proportion that working hours decrease on average, which
means that there are wage compensation in both countries. This result implies that monthly wages
(i.e. earnings) for treated individuals remained close to the same after the reduction in hours.
We can also infer from Table III that e¤ects are non-signicantly di¤erent from zero for the
control group, which suggests that there is no spillover e¤ect on hourly wages on the control group.
These results are in line with the legislation (in Portugal and France), as the law explicitly stated that
the monthly wage (i.e. earnings) could not decrease. What we also found is that monthly wages (i.e.
earnings) did not increase either. This result is in line with Goux, Maurin, and Petrongolo (2011) who
provide empirical evidence showing that the Aubrys Law did not have any e¤ect on workersmonthly
earnings. Therefore, the e¤ect on health seems to be explained by the mandated reduction of working
hours and not due to higher earnings.
7 Conclusion
The overall theoretical e¤ect of reductions in working hours on health outcomes is ambiguous, and
therefore empirical evidence is needed. Until now there has been no such empirical evidence. To our
knowledge, we provide the rst of such evidence. The identication of the health e¤ects of reductions
in working hours in a regression framework becomes complicated, as working hours may be endogenous
due to the so-called healthy worker e¤ect. This refers to the fact that workers with good mental and
physical health are generally more likely to work longer hours than those with fair or bad health.
To overcome these caveats, we exploit exogenous reductions in working hours coming from labour
regulation for two countries with two di¤erent levels of working hours (France and Portugal, with
35 and 40 weekly hours, respectively). To enhance comparability between these two countries, we
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use the European Community Household Panel dataset (ECHP) between 1994 and 2001. One of the
advantages of the ECHP is that it is a homogeneous questionnaire that includes health as well as
labour information for individuals. We nd that the policy change has di¤erent e¤ects by country,
gender, and age range. In particular, we nd no signicant e¤ects for Portugal and a signicant one
for France. In France, the e¤ect is negative for men and positive for women, and in both cases the
e¤ect is signicant only for younger individuals. Furthermore, and by keeping in mind institutional
di¤erences, for men (women) the results by country may imply that the relationship between hours
and health may not be monotonic, as the country with a lower threshold of working hours (i.e., France)
presents negative (positive) e¤ects of the reduction in weekly hours, while the country with the higher
threshold (i.e., Portugal) presents no signicant e¤ects (although further research on this should be
done in the future).
These results may be explained by the trade-o¤ between the psychological and promotions hy-
potheses, where the latter seems to have stronger e¤ects than the former for young men in France,
while the reverse is true for young women. This opposite result may be found because the promotion
channel has weaker e¤ects on young women, who already internalize the e¤ect of pregnancy on their
promotion pattern. From our results, we conclude that mandated reductions in standard working
hours need to be more carefully applied with heterogeneous employees since some groups may be
worse o¤. Finally, it could be the case that the relationship between the psychological and promotions
hypotheses might behave di¤erently when higher thresholds of working hours are investigated. That
may be the case represented by Portugal, where no e¤ects were found. However, as an extension to
further test this latter hypothesis, researchers could analyze mandated reductions in standard working
hours in countries with higher thresholds of working hours.
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Summary Statistics for Portugal and France
ECHP
Portugal France
Control Treated Di¤erence Control Treated Di¤erence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SAH 1-4 (from Bad & Very Bad to Very Good) 2.33 2.33 0.00 2.71 2.81 -0.10
Weekly Hours 39.6 43.2 -3.60*** 34.2 38.9 -4.70***
ln(Household income) 14.6 14.5 0.01 12.5 12.5 0.00
Age (between 20-60 years old) 36.9 34.7 2.20 39.2 38.6 0.65
Female (male=0, female=1) 0.42 0.44 -0.02 0.79 0.38 0.40***
Children <12 1.64 1.60 0.04 1.53 1.58 -0.05
Children <16 1.80 1.79 0.01 1.83 1.83 0.00
Job satisfaction 1 (Not at all satised) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01
Job satisfaction 2 (Largely unsatised) 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00
Job satisfaction 3 (Mildly unsatised) 0.20 0.24 -0.04 0.10 0.14 -0.04
Job satisfaction 4 (Mildly satised) 0.51 0.53 -0.03 0.36 0.33 0.03
Job satisfaction 5 (Largely satised) 0.20 0.15 0.05 0.41 0.43 -0.02
Job satisfaction 6 (Fully satised) 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03
Educ 1 (3rd level = ISCED 5-7) 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.17 0.18 -0.01
Educ 2 (2nd stage = ISCED 3) 0.18 0.07 0.11*** 0.41 0.45 -0.04
Educ 3 (Less than 2nd stage = ISCED 0-2) 0.77 0.91 -0.14*** 0.42 0.37 0.05
Household size 3.81 3.89 -0.08 3.37 3.21 0.16
M. Status 1 (Married) 0.68 0.65 0.03 0.70 0.60 0.10***
M. Status 2 (separated, divorced & widowed) 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.08 -0.01
M. Status 3 (single) 0.26 0.30 -0.04 0.23 0.32 -0.09***
Type of Contract 1 (permanent employment) 0.78 0.85 -0.07*** 0.80 0.86 -0.06
Type of Contract 2 (xed-term or short term) 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.09 0.05
Type of Contract 3 (work with no contract) 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01




Summary Statistics for Portugal and France
ECHP
Portugal France
Control Treated Di¤erence Control Treated Di¤erence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Occup. 1 (Legislators/Senior O¢ cers/Managers) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
Occup. 2 (Professionals) 0.04 0.02 0.02*** 0.05 0.02 0.03***
Occup. 3 (Technical and associate professionals) 0.09 0.03 0.06*** 0.11 0.18 -0.07***
Occup. 4 (Clerks) 0.17 0.05 0.12*** 0.30 0.18 0.12***
Occup. 5 (Service and shopping) 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.21 0.09 0.12***
Occup. 6 (Skilled agriculture and sherman) 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01
Occup. 7 (Craft and related) 0.21 0.44 -0.23*** 0.06 0.22 -0.16***
Occup. 8 (Operators and assemblers) 0.12 0.14 -0.02 0.09 0.21 -0.12***
Occup. 9 (Elementary occupations) 0.17 0.14 0.03 0.15 0.07 0.08***
Ind. 1 (Agric., hunting, forestry and shing) 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
Ind. 2 (Mining and quarrying) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00
Ind. 3 (Electricity, gas and water) 0.03 0.01 0.02*** 0.02 0.02 0.00
Ind. 4 (Manufacturing) 0.23 0.45 -0.22*** 0.21 0.39 -0.18***
Ind. 5 (Construction) 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.10 -0.08***
Ind. 6 (wholesale and retail trade, etc) 0.12 0.18 -0.06*** 0.20 0.19 0.01
Ind. 7 (Hotels and restaurants) 0.04 0.08 -0.04*** 0.04 0.01 0.03**
Ind. 8 (Transport, storage and communication) 0.08 0.03 0.05*** 0.03 0.02 0.01
Ind. 9 (Financial Intermediation) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.00
Ind. 10 (R. state renting and business activities) 0.05 0.01 0.04*** 0.09 0.09 0.00
Ind. 11 (Public admin. and defense) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ind. 12 (Education) 0.10 0.01 0.09*** 0.04 0.01 0.03***
Ind. 13 (Health and social work) 0.06 0.03 0.03*** 0.13 0.06 0.07***




Average weekly working hours by group before and after the policy change
France Before After
(1) (2)
Control Group 34.2 34.4
Treated Group 38.9 37.0
Portugal Before After
Control Group 39.6 39.5
Treated Group 43.2 40.8
Table III
E¤ects of working hours regulation on weekly working hours and hourly wages
France Hours Ln(hourly wages)
Control 0.2 -0.006
Treated -1.8 0.043






Average partial e¤ects in Portugal, by gender and age range, of the hours reduction
in period t in individualsself-assessed health in period t
Men Women
Age 20-36 Age 37-60 Age 20-36 Age 37-60
Health Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE
Good Good Good Good
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1996 0.017 0.014 0.18 0.004 0.023 0.11 0.007 0.021 0.13 0.005 0.042 0.19
1997 -0.008 -0.010 -0.10 0.002 0.014 0.07 0.001 0.001 0.01 -0.004 -0.048 -0.21
1998 -0.021 -0.016 -0.21 0.001 0.007 0.03 -0.005 -0.019 -0.11 -0.003 -0.026 -0.11
1999 -0.008 -0.011 -0.10 0.005 0.031 0.15 -0.002 -0.007 -0.04 -0.001 -0.009 -0.04
2000 -0.016 -0.023 -0.20 -0.005 -0.042 -0.19 -0.001 -0.001 -0.01 -0.002 -0.025 -0.11
2001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.02 -0.006 -0.049 -0.22 -0.001 -0.005 -0.03 -0.004 -0.037 -0.16
Obs. 4,206 3,414 2,586 1,906
ICC 0.72 0.88 0.83 0.85
Cuto¤ points as well as the estimated coe¢ cients of the rest of the covariates are not reported, but are available on
request. ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2
. The estimation is carried out with clustered standard
errors at the individual level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
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Table V
Average partial e¤ects in Portugal, by gender and age range, of the hours reduction
in period t in individualsself-assessed health in period t+1
Men Women
Age 20-36 Age 37-60 Age 20-36 Age 37-60
Health Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE
Good Good Good Good
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1996 0.017 0.016 0.19 0.001 0.001 0.01 0.011 0.033 0.20 0.010 0.072 0.34
1997 -0.008 -0.013 -0.11 0.002 0.010 0.05 0.003 0.012 0.07 -0.002 -0.020 -0.09
1998 -0.023 -0.019 -0.24 0.001 0.004 0.02 -0.040 -0.015 -0.08 -0.001 -0.004 -0.02
1999 -0.009 -0.013 -0.11 0.003 0.018 0.09 -0.001 -0.001 -0.01 -0.001 -0.001 -0.01
2000 -0.013 -0.021 -0.17 -0.008 -0.065 -0.30 -0.004 -0.017 -0.10 -0.003 -0.032 -0.15
2001 -0.008 -0.012 -0.10 -0.010 -0.078 -0.36 -0.002 -0.007 -0.04 -0.003 -0.030 -0.14
Obs. 3,639 3,159 2,098 1,733
ICC 0.79 0.90 0.82 0.87
Cuto¤ points as well as the estimated coe¢ cients of the rest of the covariates are not reported, but are available on
request. ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2
. The estimation is carried out with clustered standard
errors at the individual level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
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Table VI
Average partial e¤ects in France, by gender and age range, of the hours reduction in
period t in individualsself-assessed health in period t
Men Women
Age 20-38 Age 39-60 Age 20-38 Age 39-60
Health Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE
Good Good Good Good
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1996 0.047 -0.003 0.22 0.093 0.052 0.61 0.043 0.005 0.24 0.014 0.019 0.13
1997 -0.030 -0.005 -0.16 0.022 0.023 0.18 0.073 0.001 0.39 0.011 0.012 0.10
1998 -0.131 -0.101 -0.93*** -0.009 -0.012 -0.08 0.153 -0.025 0.74** 0.016 0.017 0.14
1999 -0.110 -0.065 -0.72** 0.100 0.052 0.65 0.054 0.004 0.29 0.003 0.004 0.03
2000 -0.033 -0.060 -0.18 0.047 0.039 0.36 0.044 0.005 0.24 0.043 0.035 0.34
2001 -0.064 -0.020 -0.37 0.006 0.008 0.06 0.121 -0.012 0.61* 0.003 0.004 0.03
Obs. 3,876 4,585 2,214 2,204
ICC 0.49 0.56 0.56 0.66
Cuto¤ points as well as the estimated coe¢ cients of the rest of the covariates are not reported, but are available on
request. ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2
. The estimation is carried out with clustered standard
errors at the individual level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
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Table VII
Test for endogenous attrition for Portugal and France
Portugal France
Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Numwaves 0.020* 0.028* -0.012 0.018
(0.012) (0.016) (0.010) (0.014)
Clustered standard errors are at the individual level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
Table VIII
Coe¢ cients of the random-e¤ect ordered probit for Portugal
in the unbalanced case with and without the attrition indicators
Men Women
No With No With
Indicator Indicator Indicator Indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1996 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.16
1997 0.01 0.01 -0.08 -0.08
1998 0.18 0.17 -0.11 -0.11
1999 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
2000 -0.14 -0.14 -0.05 -0.05
2001 -0.05 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09
ICC 0.77 0.78 0.84 0.86
Log Likelihood -5,263 -5,263 -3,261 -3,261
Obs. 7,620 4,492
ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2




Coe¢ cients of the random-e¤ect ordered probit for France
in the unbalanced case with and without the attrition indicators
Men Women
No With No With
Indicator Indicator Indicator Indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1996 0.43 0.43 0.02 0.03
1997 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.14
1998 -0.48** -0.48** 0.33 0.33
1999 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
2000 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.19
2001 -0.15 -0.15 0.12 0.12
ICC 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.58
Log Likelihood -7,283 -7,283 -3,707 -3,707
Obs. 8,461 4,418
ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2




Comparison of coe¢ cients between the balanced and unbalanced panel for Portugal
Balanced Unbalanced
Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1996 0.19 0.24 0.13 0.15
1997 0.08 -0.19 0.01 -0.08
1998 0.27 -0.06 0.18 -0.11
1999 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.04
2000 -0.26 -0.17 -0.14 -0.05
2001 -0.13 -0.04 -0.05 -0.09
ICC 0.70 0.78 0.77 0.84
Log Likelihood -2,726 -1,403 -5,263 -3,261
Obs. 2,989 2,069 7,620 4,492
ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2




Comparison of coe¢ cients between the balanced and unbalanced panel for France
Group 1
Balanced Unbalanced
Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1996 0.32 0.08 0.43 0.02
1997 -0.03 0.18 0.01 0.14
1998 -0.39** 0.36 -0.48** 0.33
1999 0.07 0.15 0.03 0.03
2000 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.19
2001 -0.18 0.21 -0.15 0.12
ICC 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.58
Log Likelihood -2,711 -1,316 -7,283 -3,707
Obs. 3,289 1,645 8,461 4,418
ICC is the intraclass correlation, which is equal to
2
1+2




Average partial e¤ects in Portugal, by age group and gender, of the hours reduction
in period t in individuals self-assessed health in period t (control group redened as
36-40).
Men Women
Age 20-36 Age 37-60 Age 20-36 Age 37-60
Health Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE
Good Good Good Good
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1996 0.013 0.011 0.13 0.002 0.014 0.07 -0.001 -0.001 -0.01 0.002 0.021 0.09
1997 -0.014 -0.019 -0.17 0.001 0.010 0.05 0.014 0.019 0.19 -0.007 -0.076 -0.34
1998 -0.023 -0.021 -0.24 0.002 0.007 0.04 -0.013 -0.031 -0.23 -0.005 -0.053 -0.24
1999 -0.016 -0.024 -0.20 0.006 0.032 0.16 -0.003 -0.004 -0.05 -0.002 -0.020 -0.09
2000 -0.016 -0.024 -0.21 -0.006 -0.044 -0.20 -0.002 -0.004 -0.04 -0.005 -0.054 -0.24
2001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.02 -0.007 -0.055 -0.26 -0.002 -0.006 -0.03 -0.005 -0.054 -0.24
Obs. 4,244 3,491 2,631 2,010
ICC 0.70 0.87 0.87 0.89
Cuto¤ points, as well as the estimated coe¢ cients of the rest of the covariates, are not reported but are available on
request. ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2
. The estimation is carried out with clustered standard
errors at the individual level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
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Table XIII
Average partial e¤ects in France, by age group and gender, of the hours reduction in
period t in individualsself-assessed health in period t (control group redened as age
31-35)
Men Women
Age 20-38 Age 39-60 Age 20-38 Age 39-60
Health Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE
Good Good Good Good
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1996 0.019 -0.006 0.79 0.113 0.054 0.72 -0.009 -0.003 -0.06 0.033 0.056 0.35
1997 0.044 -0.002 0.21 0.003 0.004 0.03 0.087 -0.001 0.45 0.006 0.008 0.06
1998 -0.091 -0.043 -0.56 -0.002 -0.010 -0.07 0.130 -0.015 0.64* 0.029 0.027 0.24
1999 -0.085 -0.037 -0.51 0.091 0.050 0.64 0.046 0.005 0.25 0.015 0.016 0.13
2000 -0.016 -0.002 -0.09 -0.015 -0.022 -0.14 0.008 0.002 0.05 0.031 0.028 0.25
2001 -0.037 -0.007 -0.20 0.061 0.163 0.81** 0.160 -0.027 0.77* 0.012 0.013 0.10
Obs. 3,842 4,559 2,118 2,085
ICC 0.49 0.56 0.52 0.67
Cuto¤ points, as well as the estimated coe¢ cients of the rest of the covariates, are not reported but are available on
request. ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2
. The estimation is carried out with clustered standard
errors at the individual level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
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Table XIV
Average partial e¤ects in France, by gender and age range, of the hours reduction in
period t in individualsself-assessed health in period t. Model with a lagged dependent
variable as a covariate.
Men Women
Age 20-38 Age 39-60 Age 20-38 Age 39-60
Health Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE
Good Good Good Good
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1996 0.035 -0.001 0.16 0.096 0.058 0.62 0.048 0.006 0.26 -0.002 -0.003 -0.02
1997 -0.012 -0.002 -0.06 0.034 0.035 0.26 0.066 0.004 0.34 0.017 0.018 0.14
1998 -0.127 -0.113 -0.88*** -0.010 -0.016 -0.10 0.147 -0.019 0.69** 0.025 0.025 0.20
1999 -0.081 -0.039 -0.48 0.110 0.059 0.69 0.024 0.005 0.13 0.013 0.015 0.11
2000 -0.033 -0.008 -0.17 0.032 0.034 0.24 0.036 0.006 0.19 0.050 0.039 0.37
2001 -0.077 -0.036 -0.45 -0.009 -0.014 -0.08 0.112 -0.006 0.54 0.001 0.002 0.01
Obs. 3,419 4,357 1,931 2,071
ICC 0.32 0.33 0.45 0.38
Cuto¤ points, as well as the estimated coe¢ cients of the rest of the covariates, are not reported but are available on
request. ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2
. The estimation is carried out with clustered standard
errors at the individual level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
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